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It’s just another war! 
Pauline Collins* 
This article describes the increasing use of 
private military corporations (PMCs) and the 
implications for International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL). After considering the development 
of the laws of war alongside the rise of 
corporations the author questions the likely 
effect this new development may have for 
sovereign states and the notion that only states 
have the right to control military power. The 
author argues that this development will have 
consequences for sovereign democracies, IHL 
and Human Rights. 
 
 
The thought of 20 million people killed in 
conflicts around the globe since World War II 
can leave one believing that conflict seems 
inevitable, certain and evermore deadly.  The 
inevitability and increase in conflict can be 
discerned from the fact that more 
peacekeeping missions have occurred during 
the 1990’s than the entire life span of the 
United Nations. This raises the question is it a 
‘just war’ or is it just another war? 
 
Development of IHL 
 
The Christian ages concept of justa causa 
meaning ‘just cause’ as an argument for war 
was inevitably found to be wrong. It was a 
self-serving argument that could be used to 
make any conflict, where the cause was based 
on religious or moral grounds, appear 
acceptable.  
 
In the 18th century’s Age of Enlightenment 
more stringent rationales for the conduct of 
war were formulated and concepts such as 
Rousseau’s social contract1 and a civil society 
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were adopted. War needs more than a just 
cause; as with any deadly game a strict code 
of conduct and rules are required. Henry 
Dunant, witnessing the carnage on the 
battlefields of Solferino Italy in 1859, 
organized the establishment of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
leading to the Geneva Convention of 1864. 
In 1863 President Abraham Lincoln 
instigated General Order No.100, otherwise 
known as the Lieber Code. This Code ruled 
out the practices of ‘no quarter’, leaving 
wounded enemy to die, or killing those 
whom surrendered. So the laws of war 
developed and have been distilled in their 
current form in the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols.2 
These provide the framework for IHL and 
address the underlying concerns for 
humanity within the conduct of war. The 
Progress report on the prevention of armed 
conflict prepared by the now retired United 
Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan and 
presented to the Sixtieth Session of the 
General Assembly on 18 July 2006 
acknowledges that while a culture of 
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prevention is developing, more needs to occur 
between the rhetoric and reality at the 
operational, structural and systemic levels, 
including the strengthening of norms and 
institutions, to prevent wars and the ongoing 
destruction of lives. 
 
Rationale for the Rules of War 
 
The IHL principles of discrimination and 
proportionality3 were developed in detail to 
ensure that those who participated in conflict 
were clear about the rules. These rules 
attempted to provide a balance between 
military goals and the protection of humans 
during war. Combatant immunity is a key 
principle of IHL that allows combatants in 
conflict to engage in activity that in non-
conflict would be considered criminal, namely 
the deliberate killing of another. This dramatic 
overturning of basic principles of humankind 
calls for considerable control requiring laws of 
war which specify the criteria for military 
command and control.   
 
Lawful combatants are established by factors 
such as: (1) whether they are under 
responsible command; (2) whether they are 
wearing a fixed and recognisable sign, or (3) 
whether they are carrying arms openly. 
Through this process national armies are held 
accountable, ultimately to their citizens. The 
United Nations Charter has limited the use of 
force to the realms of self-defence with legal 
use of force being possible in only four 
situations.4  
So one may well ask what has happened to all 
that? Why are we seeing the rhetoric of ‘just 
cause’ and ‘moral right’ return?5 Why do we 
                                                          
                                                                                       
3 Additional Protocol I arts 48 & 51. 
4 Art 2(4) of the United Nations Charter provides four 
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, 
namely: Art. 51 – individual or collective self-defence; 
Ch VII –Security Council action; Art.10,11 &14 – 
General Assembly recommendation for UN force; Art 
53 – authorised UN regional action. 
5 See, eg, United States President George W. Bush, 
State of the Union Address (2003) in which he stated 
‘The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, 
it is God's gift to humanity…we do not claim to know 
all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, 
see played across our TV screens wounded 
soldiers who are hors de combat being shot 
in the battlefield? 6 More disturbingly why 
are civilian employees of PMCs, involved in 
interrogating prisoners of war, carrying 
weapons in conflict zones, and openly 
participating and profiting in the theatre of 
war? And why are PMC employees now 
considered fair game by insurgent and rebel 
groups?7  
 
The conduct of war has changed and IHL 
may have to catch up if it is not to become 
redundant. It has been suggested that much 
of the terminology of the Geneva 
Conventions and the legal paradigm in which 
war is conducted, has become redundant. 
Concepts such as international and internal 
conflict no longer reflect the real world.  
John Ralston Saul has referred to it as 
‘normalization of irregular wars’.8 With the 
so-called ‘war on terror’ the debate rages 
around the Geneva Conventions applicability 
to wars, which are conducted very differently 
to the way envisioned at the time of their 
creation.  
 
One argument is that the laws are valid but 
not being observed; another argument is that 
they no longer cover the reality and should 
be drafted anew.9 We have witnessed the 
 
placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of 
life, and all of history. May He guide us now. And 
may God continue to bless the United States of 
America’<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/01/20030128-19.html> at 29 June 2004. 
6 R Fisk, 2004 “Smoke Him”: Video shows wounded 
men being shot by US Helicopter, May 6 
Counterpunch, (ed) Cockburn, A & St Clair, 
J.<.http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk05062004.html
> at July 2005. 
7 See, eg, T Wagner, April 22, 2005 ‘More 
Blackwater employees killed in Iraq’, Associated 
Press 
<http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?st
ory=85371&ran=122760 >at 1 March 2006. 
8 J R Saul, The Collapse of Globalism and the 
reinvention of the world, 2005 Penguin Books, p.258. 
9 R.E. Brooks, ‘War everywhere: Rights, National, 
Security Law and Law of Armed Conflict in the Age 
of Terror’, 2004 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol 153 675-761. 
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development of a new phenomenon such as 
stateless fighters with no clear chain of 
command and no uniforms fighting a war 
across state boundaries, with no foreseeable 
possibility of termination or winning. With 
this possibility of indeterminate conflict the 
question of endgame arises.  
 
President Bush declared the Third Geneva 
Convention is no longer applicable and has 
had amendments passed to retrospectively 
prohibit prosecutions of individuals, including 
civilians, who engage in "outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment," on the basis that this 
terminology is too vague to enforce. This is a 
response to avoid any prosecutions of 
administration officials and members of the 
CIA as a result of the US Supreme Courts 
ruling in Hamdan v. Rusmfeld 548 US, 126 S 
Ct  2749 (2006), that ‘common article 3’ of 
the Geneva Conventions did apply. The 
Military Commissions Act 2006 provides in 
sec5(a)  
In General- No person may invoke the 
Geneva Conventions or any protocols 
thereto in any habeas corpus or other 
civil action or proceeding to which the 
United States, or a current or former 
officer, employee, member of the 
Armed Forces, or other agent of the 
United States is a party as a source of 
rights in any court of the United States 
or its States or territories. 
Rather than the reduction of standards to more 
brutalizing levels, there is a greater need to 
tighten the constraints and strengthen the 
culture of non- violence.  
 
PMCs further confuse the issues surrounding 
the war on terror. The Working Group on the 
use of mercenaries as a means of violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of the 
rights of persons to self-determination, 
established in July 2005 by the Commission 
on Human Rights resolution 2005/2, has 
expressed concern at the increasing 
phenomenon of outsourcing core military 
functions to PMCs by states. Although the 
Working Group encourage states to accession 
of the 1989 Convention Against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries Res 44/34 4/12/1989 (Australia 
not being a party to the treaty), they 
acknowledge that  
…the creation of transnational 
companies or satellite subsidiaries 
with legal personality in one country, 
providing services in another and 
recruiting personnel from third 
countries… fall into a grey area not 
specifically covered by the 1989 
Convention, which demonstrates the 
need for appropriate national 
regulation, control and monitoring.10  
 
The need for democratic control over the 
military is essential to the fulfilment of the 
rule of law in healthy democracies. Richard 
Ponzio has noted… 
Afghanistan, security institutions may 
actually rest in private hands – with 
war lords, paramilitary groups or 
private security companies – and 
thereby contribute to crime and 
human rights violations…Indeed, this 
situation has helped to sustain 
Afghanistan’s deadly conflict over 
the years.11  
This raises even greater concerns for peace 
when military forces extend beyond state 
armies to PMCs. 
 
The Corporation 
 
 The corporation, in its endless pursuit of 
wealth, is unfettered by geographical 
location and national sovereignties. It has 
taken wing like a pterodactyl dinosaur, 
                                                          
10 The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a 
means of violating human rights and impeding the 
exercise of the rights of persons to self-determination: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/ind
ex.htm > at 1 Oct 2006. 
11 R Ponzio, Public Security Management in Post 
conflict Afghanistan: Challenges to building local 
ownership Chpt 3 in A H. Ebnöther and P Fluri (eds)  
After Intervention: Public Security Management in 
Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to 
Sustainable Local Ownership.2005 pp.64-65. 
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sweeping the globe in search of its next 
preyfit, like a true scavenger for gold. 
In 1990 there were 3000 
transnational’s. Today there are over 
40,000. There were 63,000 
subsidiaries. Today there are over 
820,000. Altogether these structures 
produce a quarter of the world’s GDP. 
12
A corporation files articles of incorporation 
with the government of a state within which it 
operates. If operating outside the state it 
registers with the government of the states 
within which it operates as a foreign 
corporation and may be subject to the laws of 
the host state, assuming the host state has a 
functioning legal system, which is often not 
the case where it is at war, or is a failed state. 
 
In the early 19th century corporations were 
given limited charter by the legislator of the 
state within which they operated which 
focused on the protection of the public 
interest. Later they were recognised as having 
the entitlements of a natural person (Santa 
Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad 
Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). This historic US 
Supreme Court decision was the beginning of 
power transference to wealthy corporations in 
competition with individuals, small businesses 
and now even states. From 1886 there has 
been a steady progression of legal changes to 
favour corporations, taking away the control 
of the state and its citizens.  
 
Once a corporation is registered, and focused 
on the corporate shareholders (not 
stakeholders) interests, there is little 
governmental restriction. The lifespan of a 
corporation or its ownership of land and 
capital is no longer limited. This lack of 
internal governance has raised debate on the 
need to amend section 181 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to require 
directors to consider broader issues of social 
                                                          
                                                          
12 See n 8. p.190 
responsibility as well as profit for 
shareholders.13  
 
 The UK is leading the way in this area with 
the Companies Act 2006 receiving Royal 
Assent on the 8th November 2006. This law 
requires directors to take into account 
interests of stakeholders such as employees, 
suppliers, customers, the community and the 
environment but still ultimately gives the 
shareholders interest priority. UK companies 
causing harm to people overseas may be 
bought to account in the UK courts. The UK 
has also shown considerable initiative on 
PMCs, acknowledging the delicate policy 
questions for governments who, while not 
wanting to be seen as endorsing undesirable 
activities, also do not want to limit 
companies in conducting business of 
economic benefit to the UK.14  
 
Notwithstanding this desire to maintain 
sovereignty, western governments’ liaisons 
with their corporate creations mean they are 
now entangled in a death tryst. The invasion 
of the last sacred domain of sovereign 
democratic states, namely the right to bear 
arms in defence of its citizens, is being 
handed over to PMCs. These can now be 
found in large numbers listed on public 
websites.15 In the first Gulf war in 1991 it is 
estimated the ratio of PMC personnel to state 
defence personnel was 1:100; in the 2003 
Iraq war this ratio has been reduced to1:10.16
 
The 20th century’s unique protection of these 
sacred domains is rapidly being overcome by 
their privatisation. Joel Bakan, Professor of 
13 T Wilson, ‘The Pursuit of profit at all costs, 
corporate law as a barrier to corporate social 
responsibility,’ Alternative Law Journal Vol 30: 6 
Dec 2005 278. 
14 Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
Private Military Companies Session 2001 UK. 
15 See, eg, Private Military Organization < 
http://www.privatemilitary.org/pmcs.html> at 20 
January 2006. 
16 See, eg, N Schwartz, The War Business: Pentagon’s 
Private Army (2004) 
<http://www.fortune.com/fortune/articles/0,15114,427
948,00.html > at 20 May 2005. 
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Law at University of British Columbia, has 
stated ‘No part of the public sphere has been 
immune to the infiltration of for-profit 
corporations.’17 Even Milton Friedman, 
economist and advocate of privatisation, saw 
basic functions such as the judiciary, military 
and social welfare, as being outside the arena 
of privatisation and thus insulation from 
democratic control. 
  
What is this phenomenon of the armed 
PMCs? What are the implications for 
nation states, citizens, democracies and the 
future of conflict? 
 
 According to Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
1819 definition ‘a corporation is an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only 
in contemplation of law.’ Why then have they 
become so powerful, all pervasive and 
controlling in our lives? And why are we now 
arming them?  The answer is in their ability to 
create wealth which arguably benefits 
governments and certainly shareholders.  
 
Money and conflict 
 
Multinational corporations, such as Northrop 
Grumman, Halliburton and CACI, 
manufacturers and suppliers of the weapons of 
war have seen the opportunity for the 
extension of their business into the new and 
profitable arena of security. President of 
Northrop Grumman, Ronald D. Sugar noted a 
$30 billion revenue intake for his company in 
2004 and went on to state in the annual report:  
Our strategy continues to be to 
aggressively apply Northrop 
Grumman’s formidable talent and 
technology to spur the revolutionary 
advances that are redefining what is 
possible on the battlefield, in our 
nations war on terror… all while 
creating value for our shareholders… 
Looking ahead we will…aggressively 
                                                          
                                                          
17 J Bakan The Corporation. The Pathological Pursuit 
of Profit and Power, 2004 Penguin Canada, 113. 
pursue opportunities for future 
growth.18  
 
Corporations, whose wealth now exceeds 
many nation states,19 can access the well-
trained ex-soldiers from downsized national 
armies who are ready to go anywhere and do 
anything for the right price. Examples 
abound where PMCs have operated in states 
such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Colombia, Balkans, Iraq, and Papua New 
Guinea. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, 
Special Rapporteur on the use of 
mercenaries, has commented that 
mercenaries are involved wherever there 
have been terrorist attacks and the 
international community needs to take the 
connection seriously. 20
 
For PMCs conflict, war and destruction 
equal profits.21 Where profits are to be made 
other concerns are diminished and, unless 
people debate and understand the issues, 
ensure control and accountability through 
regulation and enforcement, the situation will 
get worse. Conflict presents industry with 
opportunities, wealth and power from:  
¾ armament development and sales;  
¾ IT to support intelligence gathering and 
the sophisticated weapons technology;  
¾ the availability of scarce resources and 
opening of new markets;  
¾ provision of services to large armies;  
18 Northrop Grumman Corporation, ‘2004 Annual 
Report’, 5. <www.northropgrumman.com/ 
about_us/noc_annual_reports.html > at 30 May2005. 
19 Global Policy Forum, ‘Comparison of Revenues 
among States and TNCs’, 10 May 2000, 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/tncstat2.ht
m>  at 1 Oct 2006. 
20 Statement by Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries: 
Fifty-sixth General Assembly, Third Committee, 31 
Oct 2001 26th meeting (AM). 
21 See, e.g, The Center for Public Integrity, May 30 
2005,’ Contractors Ranked by Total Contract Value in 
Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 through July 1, 
2004’, 
<http://www.public.integrity.org/wow/resources.aspx
?act=total> at 30 May 2005; CACI International Inc 
website.  In 2003 –2004 this company increased the 
net income by 42% to $63.7m with total assets of 
$1.154B< http://www.caci.com/> at 1 July 2005 
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¾ rebuilding entire communities, cities and 
countries from their financial institutions 
through construction and infrastructure.  
If states approve PMCs move into this public 
domain the chance for peace, and security in 
the world will diminish.  
 
The UK Department for International 
Development in a review of the security sector 
in 2000 highlighted the following key 
principles for Democratic Governance of 
Security - 
¾ Ultimate authority for security must be 
held by elected representatives of the 
citizens. 
¾ Public Security should operate in accord 
with international, constitutional and 
human rights law. 
¾ Information about security planning and 
resources should be available both within 
government and publicly with small 
adjustments for national security.  
¾ Civil-military relations should be based on 
a clear hierarchy of authority in a 
relationship with civil society that is 
transparent and respects human rights. 
¾ Civil authorities accountable to citizens 
need to have the capacity to exercise 
political control over the operations and 
financing of security forces. 
¾ Civil society must be able to monitor 
security forces and have the ability to 
provide constructive input to the political 
debate on security. 
¾ Security personnel must be highly 
disciplined and trained in their duties and 
reflect the diversity of the society they 
represent. 
¾ Policy makers must place priority on 
fostering peace.22  
The introduction of PMCs raises the question 
of accountability and how any of these goals 
can be satisfied. 
 
Need to enforce control  
 
Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of the need 
to reassert public, transparent and accountable 
                                                          
                                                          
22 See n 11 pp. 93-94.  
control over security. Samuel Huntington’s 
The soldier and the State (1957) espoused 
the view of military conservatism, namely, 
that military personnel will be more reluctant 
to enter into conflict than their civilian 
counterparts. This has been overstated and 
current research establishes that civilian 
control is needed to deter the military’s 
preference for the use of force. 
Sescher’s23comprehensive study concludes 
‘that civilian control of the military is not 
merely a means to promote democracy, but it 
is also a force in favor of peace’ and 
Fordham24 establishes that access to greater 
military capability increases the likelihood of 
the use of force. 
  
While there have been some attempts to 
make corporations liable for war crimes, 
most have been unsuccessful. The first 
attempt to impose liability on a group of 
individuals in charge of a company for their 
involvement in war crimes occurred in 
United States v Kraunch et al (The I.G. 
Farben case).25  In this case twelve 
individuals in charge of a German 
pharmaceutical company were prosecuted for 
war crimes when they used concentration 
camp labour to run their factories. However, 
the prosecution was still of natural 
individuals. 
 
The US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)  has 
been called in aid most recently in the case 
of Talisman Energy v. Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan (plus other parties), in the Southern 
District of New York; The Court held that 
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and their 
23 T S. Sescher ‘Are Soldiers less War-Prone than 
Statesmen? Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol 48 No 
5 Oct 2004 746-774 p.771. 
24B O. Fordham ‘A Very Sharp Sword. The 
Influenced of Military Capabilities On American 
Decisions to Use Force’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution Vol 48 no 5 Oct 2004 632-656.   
25Kraunch et al., United States v., 8 CCL No. 10 
Trials 1081, 194; see J C. Watkins, Jr. & J P Weber, 
2006 ‘War Crimes and War Crime Trials: From 
Leipzig to the ICC and Beyond Cases, Materials and 
Comments’ University of Alabama and Carolina 
Academic Press. 
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tribunal decisions support the principle that 
private actors in addition to states are subject 
to customary international law prohibiting 
violations of jus cogens norms such as 
genocide. However, the ATCA is a procedural 
statute only, utilised where clearly defined 
norms recognised by the law of nations exist.  
 
The Talisman case concerned (private law) 
litigation launched by residents of southern 
Sudan who alleged that they were victims of 
genocide and crimes against humanity 
perpetrated by the government of Sudan and 
Talisman Energy. Jurisdiction was exercised 
over Talisman on the basis of a subsidiary’s 
contacts with NY. By lifting the corporate veil 
the subsidiary was said to be a ‘mere 
department’ of Talisman. Talisman was a 
Canadian company and Canada sent a 
diplomatic note in an earlier hearing 
expressing an objection to the exercise of 
jurisdiction under ATCA to ‘activities of 
Canadian corporations that take place entirely 
outside the US’. 26
 
It is clear that only a small number of 
international legal norms apply directly to 
corporations in the areas discussed, such as 
war crimes and forced labour or slavery. 
Based on the classical model of international 
law, international regulation of corporations 
occurs indirectly through the requirement that 
states be responsible for the regulation and 
control of non-state actors, such as 
corporations.   
 
Vazquez27 mounts the strong argument that to 
directly impose international obligations on 
corporations would disempower states and 
challenge state sovereignty. The evolution of 
                                                          
                                                          
26 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 2005 WL 2082846 (S.D.N.Y.) at 2. The 
letter stated that Canada passed the Foreign 
Extraterritorial Measures Act so the Attorney General 
of Canada could prohibit anyone in Canada from 
complying with measures from a foreign state or 
tribunal affecting international trade or commerce.  
27 C M Vazquez ‘Direct vs Indirect Obligations of 
Corporations under International Law’, 2005 Vol, 43,   
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Association 
Inc. p.927 
international legal norms and customary law 
would not develop if states lost the right to 
abrogate individuals or corporations from 
international responsibilities or the right to 
impose conflicting regulations. International 
law does not impose criminal or civil 
liability on juridical persons such as 
corporations; these remain distinctly within 
the realm of states. Even the advancements 
achieved with the International Criminal 
Court do not extend liability to corporations, 
being only applicable to ‘natural persons 
over the age of 18 years’: Art 25 (1).   
 
Many codes of conduct and standards for 
corporations to observe international human 
rights norms have been drafted but at the end 
of the day they are largely reliant on self-
regulation.28 The Norms on Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights is arguably the most comprehensive, 
and authoritative statement on international 
human rights law applicable to companies. 
While such codes have no immediate 
international law ramifications they present 
guidance for states in developing national 
regulatory frameworks. However, the 
Australian government response to the 
Norms is to leave it to self regulation 
 
The Australian Government is 
strongly committed to the principle 
that guidelines for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) should be 
voluntary. The Norms represent a 
28 See e.g United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, The Social Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc.21 at 6 (1999); International 
Chamber of Commerce, The Global Compact, 
Business and the UN, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, 
Jan.25, 2001, at 11-14; the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises, and the Draft  ‘Norms on Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’   
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13) developed at the UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights. An electronic version can be found at 
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/NormsApril2003.ht.  
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major shift away from voluntary 
adherence. The need for such a shift 
has not been demonstrated… We 
believe the way to ensure a greater 
business contribution to social 
progress is not through more norms 
and prescriptive regulations, but 
through encouraging awareness of 
societal values and concerns through 
voluntary initiatives.29
 
It seems there are benefits for governments in 
this deadly liaison.  Berg Harpviken, Strand & 
Suhrke state in relation to Afghanistan  
By collaborating with local 
commanders to hunt down suspected 
enemy units, US forces are nurturing 
the warlord phenomenon and related 
problems. The practice of arming, 
training and paying local militia units 
was formally reconfirmed as policy in 
early 2004. In pursuit of the war, the 
US has subordinated matters of 
democratic development and human 
rights to the needs of a close working 
relationship with Afghan military 
commanders at both the national and 
local levels.30  
The current crisis facing Afghanistan is 
inherent in these arrangements of momentary 
convenience, with the possibility that 
Afghanistan will now become a ‘failed state’. 
 
Definitional problems 
 
IHL has definitions for actors and non-actors 
in war zones that do not nicely fit PMCs or 
their employees. Agreements between the 
states involved in conflict and the regimes that 
they will support generally exclude the state, 
on whose territory the crime is most likely to 
                                                          
                                                          
29Focus: Corporate Governance- November 2005 
Update on the Australian Government’s corporate 
social responsibility inquires par.19  
<http:www.aar.com.au/pubscorpgov/ma/focgnov05.ht
m> at 29 September 2006 
30 K B Harpviken, A Strand & A Suhrke, ‘Conflictual 
Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years After Bonn’, 
PRIO and CMI Report, The International Peace 
Research Institute and Chr. Michelsen Institute, Oslo 
and Bergen, 2004, p.vii. 
be committed, from prosecuting. These 
contracts often involve a failed or war torn 
state, which has neither the ability nor the 
infrastructure to investigate and prosecute 
crimes. Under the terms of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq it was the 
perpetrator’s national state that was left to 
prosecute.31 This can be seriously deficient 
when we consider that for military personnel, 
who have clear military laws applicable, 
there have been minimal prosecutions and 
low sentences, even when evidence of abuse 
is blatant.32 How much more likely is it to 
happen with PMCs, in particular, in a victor 
state that does not have an interest in 
deterring its national civilians from 
participating in the ‘just cause’?  
 
A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) often 
provides immunity from local laws of host 
states to defence personnel who are subjected 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA) 
and this can be extended to civilians 
accompanying defence personnel where they 
formally agree. However, a civilian who 
does not agree to the extension of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and to whom a 
31 See Memoranda Office of the Administrator of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad, Iraq 
Public notice Regarding the Status of Coalition, 
Foreign Liaison and Contractor Personnel June 26, 
2003 which states explicitly that under ‘international 
law… [they] are not subject to local law or the 
jurisdiction of local courts. With regard to criminal, 
civil, administrative or other legal process, they will 
remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
State contributing them to the 
Coalition.’<http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/2
0030626_20030626_CPANOTICE_Foreign_Mission
_Cir.html.pdf >viewed 25 July 2008. 
32 See, eg, Taguba Report- Hearing Article 15-6 
Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2
004/800-mp-bde.htm> at 14 June2005; Tony 
Gutierrez, 28 Sept 2005, ‘England Sentenced to 3 
years for Prison Abuse’, Associated Press: Nine low-
level soldiers have faced court martial charges with  
the highest sentence being 10 years and no Officers 
have been 
tried.<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9492624/ at20> 
at January 2006.  
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SOFA applies may fall outside all legal 
jurisdictions.33  
   
The US Department of Justice has published a 
number of memos confirming there is nothing 
in US law prohibiting the use of ‘cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment’ when 
committed by non-military US citizens acting 
outside the borders of the US and has backed 
this up with proposed amendments to the 
Crimes Act 1996. With the belief in a just 
cause, such people are often seen as heroes 
beyond prosecution and in the aftermath of 
war, the victor state is keen that such 
individuals not be prosecuted.  
 
The PMCs argue their desire to maintain a 
good public relations image is sufficient to 
make them want to operate within the IHL 
regime.34 However, when serious breaches of 
IHL are committed, is it enough that sacking 
of the employee is the only repercussion they 
are likely to face? Further, the corporation is 
unlikely to be subject to any prosecutions.   
 
Contrast this with the enforcement of 
discipline Australian defence personnel face 
under the DFDA where public image is all 
important. In Re Aird & Ors; Ex Parte Alpert 
(B60/2003) an Australian soldier stationed in 
Malaysia was accused of rape while on leave 
in Thailand and subjected to a court martial. 
By a 4-3 majority, the High Court held that it 
is constitutional for parliament to make the 
soldiers alleged conduct a service offence 
under the defence power. 
 
 A desire to control military personnel’s 
actions when on leave by extension of 
Australian courts martial to criminal actions in 
a friendly foreign country with a fully 
functioning criminal law system is unlikely to 
                                                          
                  
33 ASPI ‘War and Profit Doing Business on the 
Battlefield’, 30 March 2005 
<http://www.aspi.org.au/board.cfm?pubID=66# >at 27 
September 2006. 
                                        
34 See, eg, Sandline International,’ Private Military 
Companies- Independent or Regulated? 28 March 
1998<http://www.sandline.com/white/regulation.doc> 
at 24 May 2005. 
be applied to PMC employees, even when 
contracted to governments. This may well 
result in reluctance on the part of PMCs to 
consent to the DFDA applying to their 
employees.  
 
Supposing a PMC employee contracted to 
the Australian Defence force goes to South 
Africa on leave and there, as a civilian, rapes 
a woman. If it is known the employee is 
connected to Australia’s defence then it 
could be seen as damaging Australia’s 
reputation. The fact that the person is a 
civilian and on holiday at the time would not 
necessarily prevent the problem arising. The 
question of service connection arises and 
could still clearly effect Australia’s 
reputation.  In theory civilians holidaying in 
a foreign country, could be subject to court 
martial under Australian law whilst 
employed by a PMC contracted to the 
Australian government, and having 
consented to the application of the DFDA. If 
they have not consented to its application, 
but it is publicly known of their contractual 
relationship with the government, then not 
only is a different standard applicable, as 
between defence employees and PMC 
employees, but Australia still faces the same 
consequence to its reputation, however, with 
no recourse for action.  
 
Furthermore, if it is not publicly known that 
the PMC is contracted by the government 
then there is little political repercussion when 
a PMC employee commits an offence, or is 
killed or captured in a conflict zone as 
opposed to regular defence personal.35 The 
lack of public outcry enables the conflict to 
continue out of the public eye. The risk of 
political fallout is lessened and maintaining 
domestic support for the war effort is easier. 
The audience costs of governments 
35 For instance how well known are the names of Jon 
Hadaway, Wayne Schultz, Chris Ahmelman (private 
contractors killed in Iraqi) compared to the now 
household name of Private Jake Kovco.  
<http://www.icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx> at 1 Oct 
2006. 
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conducting foreign policy in the public arena 
can have negative consequences in the 
domestic arena politically, thus increasing the 
incentive for governments to use private third 
actors away from the public spotlight.36 Being 
removed from such PMCs activities, states can 
engage in clandestine operations aimed to 
further their interests in many different ways, 
including economically, ideologically and 
politically.37 Lai’s 38 study indicates the result 
of private mobilization significantly increases 
the likelihood that conflict will escalate into 
war.  
 
Despite the Additional Protocols I & II 
attempts to cover civil conflict and 
unconventional armies, combatants like al 
Qaeda and PMC employees in combat zones 
who carry no loyalties to a nation state, 
arguably fall outside the control of the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols. The 
notion of ‘unlawful combatant’, a term not 
used in the Geneva Conventions, introduces 
the possibility that states can step outside the 
intent of the law as imposed by the 
conventions by merely changing the 
terminology. Liberia has already used the U.S 
precedent when detaining an American 
national, Hassan Bility in 2002 for 6 months 
without trial, saying the activist was detained 
as an ‘unlawful combatant’.  
 
Jurisdictional issues 
 
Under the classical model of international law 
nation states, since the Peace of Westphalia, 
                                                          
36 M Baum ‘Going Private’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution Vol 48 No 5 Oct 2004 603-631. 
37See, eg, S M Hersch, 2004 ‘The Gray Zone: Has a 
Secret Pentagon Program come to Abu Ghraib?’ The 
New Yorker< 
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/040524fa_fa
ct >at 9 February 2006; Mining Watch Canada, ‘Anvil 
Mining and the Kilwa Massacre, D.R. Congo: Canadian 
Company Implicated?’, 
<www.miningwatch.ca/index.php?/Anvil/Anvil_Minin
g_Kilwa > at 1 July 2005. 
38 B Lai ‘The Effects of Different Types of Military 
Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol 48 No 2 April 2004 
211-229. 
have been considered the only actors on the 
international plane entitled to exclusive 
control over military power. Corporations 
being government creations are in theory 
answerable to the state. However, with 
privatisation of sacred areas of the public 
domain, globalisation and governments ‘in-
bed’ with corporations, the pterodactyls are 
left free to wonder the globe in search of 
their preyfits. Most concerning of all is that 
globalization has led to multinational 
corporate pterodactyls being largely left to 
operate in foreign jurisdictions with states 
having minimal will to enforce the law. As 
can be seen from the Talisman case, Canada 
was not interested in regulating Talisman’s 
conduct even when associated with serious 
infringement of the law of nations. 
 
Corporations in the global arena can pick and 
choose their corporate home to suit the 
degree of freedom they desire. For instance, 
choosing a state such as Delaware, U.S.A, 
means the corporation pays no taxes, or 
Nevada, U.S.A, means a corporation can be 
registered without record of who owns it. 
There is need for transnational regulations 
that pierce the corporate veil by tracing 
liability back to the parent companies. 
Liability of natural persons within companies 
as well as the juridical entity itself has to be 
followed through. The rules of jurisdiction, 
with each state determining whether claims 
can be bought, is an issue that must be faced 
by the international community as a whole. 
 
PMC employees have no loyalty to any 
particular nation, only to the company, who 
in turn has a sole legal obligation to its 
shareholders to return a profit. This defeats 
the governance principle of an army 
reflecting the diversity of the population it is 
established to defend. Noam Chomsky has 
criticised corporations for their fascist 
structures: 
I think that until major institutions of 
society are under popular control of 
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participants and communities, it’s 
pointless to talk about democracy.39  
 
Responsibility of multinational corporations 
for criminal and tortious acts is a grey area, 
crossing national, private international and 
public international law.  The use by US 
courts of the ATCA has itself incurred 
criticism for the courts activism in this area. 
Globalisation has resulted in a series of 
fragmented sovereignties with diminishing 
barriers between jurisdictions making 
accountability almost impossible.  
 
Threats to sovereign states 
 
 The development of PMCs becomes a 
dangerous liaison for states and their 
governments. We see taxpayer funded and 
trained defence personnel leaving defence 
services to chase the lure of dollars to be had 
with PMCs.40 This presents a new threat to 
national armies to avoid becoming depleted 
and second rate. Governments will have no 
choice but to outsource control to the PMCs.  
 
Corporations are dependant on governments 
for their very existence, but it is difficult, and 
rare for governments to kill a corporation,41 
This will become even more so with the gun 
in the hands of their monster creations. For 
who holds the gun holds the power and what 
happens when the enemy can pay the PMC 
more, or offers a better deal? Who is left to 
                                                          
39 N Chomsky Language and Politics (1988) AK Press, 
p.162. 
40 L McIlveen, ‘High Pay goes with high-risk territory’, 
The Courier- Mail May 3, 2005: “The risks are great; 
but for former soldiers like Ahmelman, so are the 
rewards. Salaries of $9,000 a week are not uncommon.” 
4; K Landers, 11 March 2005 Skills Shortage Hits 
Defence Force, ABC Online ‘In the last two years 31 
SAS soldiers have left the Australian Defence Force to 
take up these lucrative private sector positions’. The 
former Australian Defence Force Chief, General Peter 
Cosgrove admitted to a Joint Parliamentary inquiry that 
the Australian defence force is competing with ‘mind-
boggling sums that have been dangled in front’ of 
defence personnel to attract them away from the 
Australian defence forces. 
<http://www.abc.net.au/pm/co > at 15 March 2005. 
41 See above n.17, 156-158. 
fight the ‘just war’ and where is the ability or 
incentive to develop and enforce applicable 
laws of war?  
 
The Australian Government while not a 
signatory to the Mercenary Convention of 
1989 has the capacity through legislation like 
the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and 
Recruitment) Act 1978 to prohibit Australian 
citizens and those ordinarily resident in 
Australia from engaging in hostile acts in 
foreign states. However, while this 
possibility for control at a domestic level 
exists the will to use it is questionable. The 
Minister has the ability to exempt 
organisations and the law only relates to 
recruiting not actual operations in foreign 
states.  
 
States are encouraged to adopt the draft 
guidelines on the Norms on Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights to model domestic legislation for the 
control of PMCs. However, our current 
government shows a distinct preference for 
self-regulation as previously noted. With 
state reluctance to take control of its 
corporate creations and the move of such 
juridical transnational entities into the 
domain of defence and security, the efficacy 
of relying on state enforcement of 
international obligations comes under 
question.  
 
 As Professor Bakan notes:  
The notion that business and 
government are and should be 
partners is ubiquitous, unremarkable, 
and repeated like a mantra by leaders 
in both domains… Democracy, on 
the other hand,…requires that the 
people, through the governments they 
elect, have sovereignty over 
corporations, not equality with them: 
that they have authority to decide 
what corporations can, cannot, and 
must do. If corporations and 
governments are indeed partners, we 
should be worried about the state of 
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our democracy, for it means that 
government has effectively abdicated 
its sovereignty over the corporation.42
 
Conclusion 
 
 
With the international obligation to regulate 
non-state actors imposed on states, who for 
reasons described lack the will to do so, 
together with definitional, jurisdictional and 
enforceability issues, PMCs are left largely to 
their own devices in conflict zones. It is a 
bleak future for peace and human rights when 
governments’ blind infatuation with their 
corporate creations means that ‘Cronus like’ 
PMCs may turn against their very creator, 
those whose existence they are arguably there 
to protect.  
 
There is a need for public debate, awareness 
and outrage at this invasion of the final 
frontier, namely the right of governments to 
control military power. Citizens should 
demand that it be rolled back with states 
taking the responsibility they hold to their 
people seriously by legislating to render 
unlawful such activities and stridently 
enforcing such legislation. This debate and 
these changes are vital for the future of 
democracy and peace in the world. 
 
See Memoranda Office of the Administrator of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad, Iraq 
Public notice Regarding the Status of Coalition, Foreign 
Liaison and Contractor Personnel June 26, 2003 which 
states explicitly that under ‘international law… [they] 
are not subject to local law or the jurisdiction of local 
courts. With regard to criminal, civil, administrative or 
other legal process, they will remain subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the State contributing them to 
the Coalition.’ 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030626_200
30626_CPANOTICE_Foreign_Mission_Cir.html.pdf 
viewed 25 July 2008. 
                                                          
42 Ibid, 108. 
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